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Summary findings
To find out why African countries'  experience with  *  Ethnic tensions.
urbanization and sustained growth appeared to differ  *  Civil disturbances.
from that of other countries, Fay and Opal investigated  In addition, the relationship between economic
the determinants of urbanization across countries over  incentives and urbanization is weaker in countries with
40 years.  fewer civil or political liberties.
Rather than studying individuals' decisions to migrate,  Factors other than initial urbanization level that help
they relied on macroeconomic data and cross-country  explain the speed of urbanization include:
comparisons. A central hypothesis of their study: that  *  The sector from which income growth is derived.
individuals move (with varying degrees of ease) in  *  Ethnic tensions.
response to economic incentives and opportunities.  If  *  Civil disturbances and democracy (these two slow
location incentives are distorted, so is growth.  the pace of urbanization if all else is constant).
The authors find that urbanization levels are closely  * Rural-urban wage differentials, whether they
correlated with levels of income. But urbanization  represent an urban bias or simply lower productivity in
continues even during periods of negative growth,  agriculture relative to other sectors.
carried by its own momentum, largely a function of the  The weak relationship that this study shows between
level of urbanization. From that viewpoint, Africa's  urbanization and traditionally accepted migration factors
urbanization without growth is not a puzzle.  suggests that in Africa economists are overlooking part of
Factors other than income that help predict differences  the urbanization story. The fact that the informal sector
in levels of urbanization across countries include:  appears to provide a significant source of income for
* Income structure.  urban migrants, coupled with the overlap between rural
* Education.  and urban activities, may shed light on the nature of
*  Rural-urban wage differentials.  urbanization in Africa.
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Sustained economic growth is always accompanied by urbanization. But in Africa,
urbanization occurred without growth. Is the implication that Africa's urbanization
process was distorted? Or rather that urbanization is not always accompanied by
sustained growth. And that in economic downturns, the poor and the migrants don't
necessarily flock back to rural areas.
The initial motivation for this paper was to understand why once again, Africa appeared
to be "different." To do so, we investigate the determinants of urbanization across
countries, over the last 40 years.  Most analysis of this kind focus on individual's
decision to migrate. Here, we rely on macro data and cross-country comparisons instead.
This paper then is about the determinants of urbanization everywhere. It is not limited to
Africa, although it does focus on trying to answer the puzzle raised by the phenomenon
of urbanization without growth in Africa.
Why this interest in urbanization at a macro level? A central hypothesis of the paper is
that individuals move (with varying degrees of ease) in response to economic incentives
and follow economic opportunities. If location incentives are distorted, so presumably is
the growth process. Distorted location incentives may also result in higher than
necessary social and environmental costs, that are not offset by the increase in
productivity and wealth that usually accompanies urbanization.
An additional objective of the paper is to show that urbanization is part and parcel of the
structural changes that accompany economic development. And that there is very little
point in trying to stem it. Where governments have tried, they have generally failed
(China, Soviet Union, Vietnam), creating substantial pent-up demand that led to brutal
adjustments (colonial Africa, Trujillo's Dominican Republic) and generally harmed the
poorest (Nyerere's Tanzania.)
Understanding the dynamics of urbanization can help policy makers mitigate its costs
rather than worsen them. In many cases, slums are created and remain locus of
environmental and human disasters for decades because of the myth that slums dwellers
are there temporarily and will return to the country. Fortunately, in most cases, the
income of the slum dwellers eventually increase with growth, and the slums are upgraded
and turned into middle class neighborhood.
But the growth and upgrading process is slow. And it can fail to happen. The average
African country's urban population grew by 5.2% per annum over the 1970-95 period,
while its GDP per capita was falling at an annual rate of 0.66%. This implies that
urbanization occurred without generating the resources (public or private) and
employment opportunities to accommodate  this surge in urban population.  Today, up to
two thirds of African urban dwellers live in informal settlements with inadequate
transport, water, sanitation, electricity, and health services. Housing finance systems are
non-existent or limited to upper income sectors. Crime is a major problem in many
African cities, and worsening with increased poverty and deteriorating living conditions.
2Unless economic growth accelerates substantially, there will be insufficient resources to
fund the backlog of investments, let alone future requirements.  Overstretched central
governments budgets are unlikely to suffice to fund the needed investments.  Yet
accelerated growth is hampered by dysfunctional cities, which cannot service private
sector needs or provide markets for agricultural products.
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly looks at regional differences
in urbanization patterns, focussing on Africa. Part III offers a rapid review of the
literature on the determinants of urbanization. Part IV reports the results of testing these
hypothesis at the macro level and attempts to explain differences in levels of urbanization
across countries while Part V looks at differences in the rate of growth of urbanization
across countries.  The last part concludes.
Throughout this paper, the expressions "overurbanized" or "underurbanized" are used.
These expressions do not refer to deviation from an ideal level of urbanization.  Rather,
they are relative concepts, denoting differences from expected levels of urbanization,
given sample norms. The level of urbanization is defined as the share of national
population residing in urban areas, PU/P,  where the definition of urban areas may vary
across countries.  The rate of urbanization is the change in this level:
Pu
p
where dots denote percentage change.
Africa's  urbanization  in comparative  perspective
Africa emerged from the colonial period very underurbanized relative to its level of
income.  This was due, at least in part, to colonial regimes' repression of  rural-urban
migration (Tarver, 1994). Africa in the early 1960s had about the same level of
urbanization as East and South Asia, although it was much wealthier (Figure 1.) Its
urbanization then proceeded along with income growth until the mid-70s.  Africa then
entered a prolonged recession, while its population continued to flock to cities.  The
result is that today, Africa is relatively overurbanized given its income and economic
structure.'
Africa's urbanization process was rapid, but appeared to follow a "normal" urbanization
path until the mid-1970s.  After about 1974, Africa diverged significantly from the world
trend as it continued to urbanize more rapidly than other regions, even as its economies
were collapsing, or at least stagnating (Figure 1.) The question, then, is what caused this
phenomenon.  Urban bias and distorted location policies? Civil war and agricultural
shocks which sent people to cities where aid was concentrated?  Was it a cause or a
symptom of what Easterly and Levine described as Africa's growth tragedy (Easterly and
Levine, 1997.) To determine whether -- or how -- Africa's  urbanization experience has
' In 1995,  31%  of Africa's  population  was  urban,  but agriculture  still  employed  70%  of its labor  force.  In
contrast,  in South  Asia  23%  of the  population  resides  in urban  areas,  but agriculture  occupies  only  62%  of
the  labor  force.  Agriculture  accounts  for  about  30%  of GDP  in  both  regions.
3differed from other countries, we first investigate determinants of urbanization across
countries.
Figure 1.  Africa's urbanization in comparative perspective
Urbanization and income by region
(own  regional  average  calculations,  annually 1960-1995)
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A caveat: nowhere does urbanization stop during economic downturns
Urbanization without growth is not a uniquely African phenomenon. The quasi totality
of countries that experienced negative growth continued to urbanize.  Out of 187
observations in our database that show average annual negative growth over a period of
five years, 183 experienced positive urbanization. This is true across regions (Figure 2.)
Figure 2.  Urbanization continues even in periods of negative growth, 1960-95
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4The notion that migrants return to rural areas when growth slows down does not hold - at
least not in any systematic manner.  Urbanization does not even noticeably slow down
during economic downturns, implying that people continue to move to cities even when
economic growth is low.  The prime determinant of whether urbanization increases
rapidly or not is not whether income growth is positive or negative. Rather, it is whether
the level of urbanization in the country is high or low (Table 1.)
The implication appears to be that Africa differs from the rest of the world more because
of its poor growth performance than because of its urbanization process.  This does not,
however, answer the question of whether Africa has followed a distorted urbanization
process.  To do so, we briefly review the literature on the causes of urbanization, and turn
to an empirical estimation of the determinants of urbanization.
Table  1. Growth  in urbanization  slows  as the level of urbanization  increases,  but is unaffected  by
growth  in income
Level of urbanization  GDP per capita growth  Rate of growth of urbanization
(urban population as share of total)  (annual average)  (annual average, %)
Less than 25%
N=197  Average = 16  Positive  2.90
N=31  Average = 16  Negative  3.37
Between 25 and 50%
N=180  Average = 38  Positive  1.78
N=71  Average = 36  Negative  1.63
Between 50 and 75%
N=153  Average = 61  Positive  1.09
N=34  Average = 61  Negative  1.13
Above 75%
N=102  Average = 85  Positive  0.31
N=20  Average = 83  Negative  0.70
N= number of observations.
5Causes  of Rural-Urban  Migration
An increase in a country's urban population can be due to three causes: the natural
growth rate of the urban population, the re-classification of rural settlements as they grow
and hit the magic number that makes them cities and towns, and rural-urban migration.
Data is generally not available to distinguish among the three, although a 1979 study
showed that in 29 developing countries, between 1960 and 1970, about 61% of urban
growth resulted from natural growth. 2 More recently, it was estimated that 75% of
Mexico's urban growth in the 80s was attributable to natural growth. 3 Of greatest interest
to us, however, is rural-urban migration, as this is what is most commonly thought of as
"urbanization."
Economic  incentives
Migration, whether circular, seasonal or permanent, is often a response to economic
incentives. The classic analysis of rural-urban migration (Harris and Todaro, 1970)
attributes migration to the existence of relatively better economic conditions in urban
areas. According to this model, migrants compare expected wages in the city to
alternative rural income.  If urban wages are higher (perhaps through government wage
policies or trade unions), rural people will be attracted to the city.  If expected urban
income is much higher than rural income, rural-urban migration may occur even if the
employment prospects in the city are dim. Migrants may be willing to endure a period of
unemployment if expected urban income is sufficiently high (Mazumdar, 1987).
Aside from the higher expected urban income pulling rural people into urban areas, there
may be factors "pushing" them out of rural areas. A general decline in agricultural
commodity prices since the mid-1970s may have contributed to a decline in rural
incomes, which can be highly vulnerable to world market price fluctuations. Increased
population density and environmental degradation may also have led to a land shortage
among rural peoples, encouraging out-migration (Bryceson and Jamal, 1997). And, of
course, higher agricultural productivity in the rural areas releases people and resources
for migration into the city, as happened in East Asia.
Rural-urban migration may also follow from a risk diversification strategy. Agricultural
income can be highly variable due to changes in climate and rainfall, agricultural market
prices, access to land, illness, and war (Bryceson and Jamal, 1997). Some rural
household members may migrate to urban areas to reduce family vulnerability to these
risks, especially if times of economic adversity in urban areas do not normally coincide
with those of rural areas. Many households straddle the rural-urban divide, and
2 This varied between 38% in Turkey and  74% inSouth Africa where rural-urban migration was restricted.
Quoted in Lucas, 1998b prepared for the summer workshop of the 1999-2000 World Development Report.
The study is referred to as "Preston, 1979."
3 Study by U.S. Bureau of the Census, quoted in Lucas, 1998b
4The  Harris-Todaro model has been challenged, both theoretically and empirically.  There is however
evidence that some migrants move to town and then conduct an employment search.
6remittances between the rural household and migrants enable income smoothing (Lucas,
1998b.) 5
There is no systematic evidence showing that better services in urban areas
(infrastructure,  health clinics and schools) stimulates migration, although there is
evidence that improved rural education triggers out-migration.  As to better transport, it
is unclear whether it stimulates migration, or encourages commuting and rural off-farm
employment (Lucas, 1998a)
Non-economic factors
Social and political conditions also play an important role in drawing people out of the
countryside into cities (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978). Migration to urban areas can
provide an escape from family and cultural constraints, such as restricted land access or a
low level of female independence (Tacoli, 1998). Migration to an urban area may also
occur because of an expected increase in social status and standing - the perception that
the "high life" can be found among the "bright lights" of the city.  One study of northern
Ghanaian migrants to Accra revealed this powerful "bright lights" myth - migrants had
been lured to the city by exaggerated tales of high income and technologically advanced
living, especially by returned migrants who "wished to convey to others a positive image
of themselves and their experiences."  Migrants may also seek to acquire cash income to
contribute to bridewealth as the money economy increasingly penetrates marriage rituals
(Gugler and Flanagan, 1978).
Wars and ethnic conflicts may also lead to an increase in rural-urban migration. Aside
from the impact of war on agricultural income through effects on transport and
marketing, war may also push people out of rural areas for sheer safety reasons. Ethnic
conflicts in particular increase the danger of living in an area dominated by a persecuted
ethnic group, as the potential for ethnic cleansing is high in these areas. Urban areas
generally have a higher level of ethnic diversity and thus may be safe-havens for
persecuted groups. Police protection may also be higher in urban areas, encouraging
migration from war-tom rural areas where order may be more difficult to maintain.
Distorted location incentives: the infamous urban bias
Rural-urban wage differentials in the Harris-Todaro model reflect differences in
productivity that eventually disappear as a result of rural outmigration and the
mechanization of agriculture. But policy distortions may result in wage differentials in
excess of what is warranted by productivity. Alternatively, they may depress rural
productivity or artificially inflate urban productivity for example through skewed
investment allocations.
5 Note  that  resources  can  flow  in both  directions,  and  many  rtigrant  family  will  retain  a foot  in the  rural
areas.
6 According  to Way,  the  process  of urbanization  has  contributed  to the  HIV/AIDS  pandemic  in Africa
through  this  "bright  lights"  mechanism  - populations  which  abandon  their  roots  and  head  for  the  city  have
frequently  adopted  "a lifestyle  and  behaviors  that  have  placed  them  at increased  risk  for  HIV  infection"
(435-6).
7Jamal and Weeks (1998) attribute relatively higher urban wages in Africa to its colonial
heritage. During the colonial era, higher urban wages represented a dichotomy between a
rich (European) governing class and a poor (African) agricultural class.  When
colonialism ended and an "Africanization" of urban jobs occurred, this wage gap was
maintained. These relatively higher wages were often maintained by powerful trade
unions, which had been an important force in the achievement of independence and thus
were well organized and politically powerful. Wage laborers were often rewarded
through favorable labor laws guaranteeing minimum wages and working conditions for
government workers, industrial employees, mineworkers, and other employees of the
formal sector.
Developing country government investment may have been skewed towards urban-based
industries during the 1960s and 1970s. The import-substitution strategies adopted by
many developing countries involved large-scale public works such as dams and roads,
often financed by agricultural taxes (Jamal and Weeks, 1998). Michael Lipton's  1977
account of the flow of surplus from rural to urban areas in developing countries made
famous the notion of "urban bias."  This concept emphasized the price distortions present
in many developing countries that kept the price of rural agricultural products below
world levels and the price of urban industrial products above world levels.  Robert Bates
in 1981 expanded the argument to attribute skewed investment in urban areas to the
relative political power of urban dwellers, who could organize more easily and had
greater access to government decision-makers. By influencing policy to increase
investment in urban infrastructure and industry, the urban elite could increase its income
at the expense of rural agriculture (Tacoli, 1998). More recent evidence, however,
suggests that cities -particularly large cities-subsidize  the rest of the economy, at least
in terms of public expenditures and tax revenues (Prud'homme, 1998)
Private investment may also be skewed toward cities, through the existence of "financial
urban bias."  Evidence from developing countries shows that urban areas tend to be net
users of credit, whereas rural areas tend to be net depositors - money is saved by people
in rural areas but then borrowed by firms or individuals in urban areas (Chandavarkar,
1985). This "financial urban bias" may exist because of a relatively higher degree of
credit rationing in rural areas: transaction costs are high, monitoring is difficult, and
average balances are small.  The result may be a skewing of investment towards cities, if
money is saved in rural banks but lent through urban banks to be invested in urban firms
for rates of return that are no higher than those that could be obtained in rural areas.
One important goal of the structural adjustment policies undertaken by developing
countries during the past two decades has been the reduction of these elements of "urban
bias," by liberalizing agricultural commodity prices, realigning exchange rates, and
reducing import barriers to force industrial products to compete internationally.  Whether
because of general economic decline triggering falls in formal employment, or simply
structural adjustment reducing rents to an urban elite, Jamal and Weeks (1998) maintain
that, in Africa, "the income gap between urban wage earners and the rural population has
narrowed considerably" since the mid-1970s. In fact, their study of four African
countries found that "the primary dynamic distributional relationship in Africa has been
8between rich and poor within both the urban and rural sectors," rather than simply
between rural and urban areas.
The phenomenon of "urban bias" may be better seen as a skewing of resource provision
to the rich and the elite, especially if the urban poor have limited access to these
resources.  To equate people with their place of living denies the diversity in income
groups among urban areas, and assumes that all urban dwellers benefit from policies
biased towards urban groups. Thus it may be more appropriate to discuss "elite bias"
rather than "urban bias" to take into account the economic differentiation among urban
populations.
Even if investment, credit, and fiscal and monetary policy primarily favor urban areas, it
does not necessarily constitute an "urban bias."  It may reflect differentials in rates of
return. Furthermore, there may exists an optimal level of investment in which urban
areas receive relatively more infrastructure funding.  If agglomeration economies exist in
a certain industry, urbanization may increase productivity in that industry.  More
generally, if urban credit and investment earn higher rates of return, it is more efficient
for credit to be concentrated in urban areas (Chandavarkar, 1985). The very process of
economic development implies disequilibria among rural and urban sectors, regions, and
populations.  Unequal resource allocation per capita is omnipresent in efficient
economies, and may even be an impetus for economic development (Becker et al., 1994).
9Explaining  levels  of urbanization  across  countries
Many economists and demographers have used the factors mentioned above to model
rural-urban migration. These models are usually probit-type models which attempt to
determine the probability of an individual agent deciding to move to an urban area from a
rural area. These models, therefore, look not only at the characteristics of the individual
(culture, education, wealth, family support, etc), but also the individual's environmental
factors, both economic (rural-urban wage differential, returns to education, land
availability, etc) and social (the presence of violence in the rural areas, a lack of civil
freedoms).
Our study, however, focuses not on the individual, micro-economic level, but rather uses
national macroeconomic and social conditions to determine a country's urbanization
process. We look at national urbanization levels and at changes in these urbanization
levels, which to a large extent are the aggregate or the result of these individual migration
decisions. Our focus remains Africa, but to be able to identify whether Africa is
different, we look across the world to see what has been the general experience with
urbanization and economic development.
Figure  3. Urbanization  and income,
1960-857
Urbanisation  and income,
1960-85  all  countries
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7 Data:  Summers  & Heston  GDP;  Urbanization:  World  Development  Indicators.  Based  on Ingram,  1998.
10The  role of income
The share of a country's population that resides in urban areas - that is, its level of
urbanization - is highly correlated with its level of per capita income.  The share of urban
population increases rapidly at low levels of income (and of urbanization) to converge to
an urbanization level of about 80% (Figure 3).  This transformation is due to the
structural changes that accompany development. The share of GDP derived from
agriculture falls from 32% among low income countries to less than 3% among rich ones,
and the share of employment accounted for by agriculture falls by even more: from about
66% to less than 6%.
Our basic model, therefore, is that urbanization is a function of income and income
squared (to capture the non-linearity of the relationship), 8 and of the structure of the
economy:
U = E Y  (YA/Y)  (YM/Y)
which in logs yields:
u= e + a y + b y  + c  (yA-y) +d (ym-y)
In addition, we test the hypotheses mentioned above concerning rural-urban wage
differentials, urban bias, rural "push" factors, civil disturbances and wars, and civil and
political rights.  Our data is organized as an unbalanced panel data set, with observations
every five years from 1965 to 1995, for up to 100 developed and developing countries. 9
Regression 1 in Table 2 shows that income per capita, the share of GDP derived from
agriculture and manufacturing, and a time trend ("year") explain 80% of cross country
variations in levels of urbanization. 10 Because the variables are in logs, their coefficients
are elasticities. Thus a 10% increase in the share of GDP derived from manufacturing
occurs along with a 1.3% increase in the level of urbanization, while a 10% increase in
the share derived from agriculture coincides with a -1.3% decrease in the level of
urbanization.
Rural-urban  differences  in earnings
The literature on rural-urban migration discussed in the preceding section
emphasizes the importance of rural-urban income differentials in explaining decisions to
migrate. No good measure of rural and urban wages was available, so we constructed one
based on average returns to labor. As a proxy for rural wages we used the average
product in agriculture, calculated simply as agricultural GDP (YA) divided by labor force
8 Since urbanization rates are bounded at 100%, the log-linear function is inadequate. We therefore use a
polynomial to approximate the unknown function.
Our database includes 1960, but because sectoral shares of GDP were not available for 1960, most
regressions omit that year.
'°  Manufacturing was used rather than industry because industry includes mining - an activity that would
not necessarily be correlated with the kinds of structural changes relevant to explaining urbanization.
11in agriculture (LA-)  Urban wages were estimated as non-agricultural GDP divided by the
number of people employed in industry and services(Y 1+Ys)/(L 1+Ls).  RUW is the ratio




An alternative measure which omitted services and used the ratio of average product in
agriculture over that in industry was also used and tested, but had much lower
explanatory power.
The lower the rural wage relative to the urban wage, the more incentives to migrate, and
the higher the flight to the cities.  Countries with excessively low RUW should then be
overurbanized given their level of income and income structure, and the sign on RUW
should be negative. However, as people move to cities and out of agriculture, rural and
urban wages should converge. If this is the case, the coefficient on RUW should be
positive. Regression 4, which shows RUW to be positive and significant, supports this
last interpretation.
12Table  2: Explaining  levels  of urbanization
Regression  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  I1
Dates available  1965-95  1965-95  1965-95  1965-90  1965-90  1970-95  1965-95  1965-95  1965-90  1980-95  1965-90
Ln(Y)  1.46**  1.46**  1.73**  1.78**  1.91**  1.73**  1.79**  1.71**  1.80**  1.66**  2.06**
(Ln (y))
2 -0.080**  -0.080**  -0.095**  -0.10**  -0.11**  -0.096**  -0.10**  -0.095**  -0.10**  -0.090**  -0.12**
Ln (Yag/Y)  -0.13**  -0.13**  -0.13**  -0.22**  -0.12**  -0.14**  -0.16**  -0.15**  -0.22**  -0.10**  -0.18**
Ln(Ymanuf/Y)  0.13**  0.10**  0.11**  0.12**  0.15**  0.099**  0.12**  0.12**  0.11**  0.0084  0.19**
Year  0.013**  0.013**  0.013**  0.0048  0
Africa  -0.028
Africa*pre8O  -0.19**  0.27  0.14  1.30**  0.44  0.28  0.21  0.22  0.677  1.29**
Africa*post8O  0.12**  1.66**  1.54**  2.01**  1.61**  L95**  1.74**  1.61**  1.46**  2.28**
Africa*pre80*1n(Y)  -0.067  -0.031  -0.20**  -0.091  *  -0.069  -0.062  -0.041  -0.12*  -0.19**
Africa*pre80*1n(Y)  -0.24**  -0.21**  -0.29**  -0.23**  -0.28**  -0.25**  -0.22**  -0.21**  -0.32**
post80  -0.031  -0.12**  -0.12**  -0.061
Ln(Ruw)  0.18**  0.17**  0.15**
Ln(Noeduc)  -0.14**  -0.17**
(Ln(Noeduc)) 2 0.046**  0.055**





Sivard  0.076**  0.076*  0.057*
Ln(foodaidc)  -0.031*
Ln(foodaidnc)  0.084**
Adj. R 2 .801  .813  .826  .855  .875  .822  .822  .816  .856  .802  .879
N  494  494  494  398  352  437  450  494  398  331  346
The dependant variable is the log of the level of urbanization defined as (urban population/total population).  Note: *  (**) indicate significance at the 5% (10%) level.
The sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of up to 100 countries every 5 years between 1965 and 1995.  Results are robust to heteroscedasticity using White's
method.Education
We also expect  education  to be positively  correlated  with higher urbanization,  as returns
to education  tend to be higher in urban  areas. Education  itself may have an aspect  of
"urban  bias": rural students  do not necessarily  learn agricultural  skills, and may even  be
educated  in such a way as to be averse  to farming  (Gugler  and Flanagan,  1978). Using
education  data from the Barro and Lee data set (Barro  and Lee, 1996),  we find in
regression  5 that the higher the proportion  of the population  with no education,  the lower
the level of urbanization. This effect  is non-linear  however,  as evidenced  by the fact that
the square  of NOEDUC  is positive  and significant.  The interpretation  is simply  that
among  countries  with many  uneducated  people,  a very small improvement  in education  is
associated  with much  higher  urbanization. Conversely,  among  countries  with relatively
few  uneducated  people,  improvements  in education  will basically  not affect  urbanization.
Other  education  variables  are available  from Barro  and Lee, enabling  us to distinguish
among  different  levels of educational  achievements.  However,  they tend  to be very
collinear. We therefore  used  only secondary  education  (SECONDARY),  which  yielded
the best fit. It is positive  and significant,  suggesting  that a typical  country  can expect  to
be 12%  more urbanized  given  its level of income  and income  structure  than  a country
whose adult population  has half the average  years of secondary  education.
Urban bias
No good measure  of urban  bias is readily available. In particular,  it is impossible  to
measure  whether  public  investment  and spending  is biased  towards  urban areas,  due to a
lack of data and the difficulty  of assessing  which  populations  benefit from which public
investments.  Two alternative  measures  can be used as proxies. One is the difference
between  the domestic  producer  price of agricultural  products  and their international
market  prices. These are available  through  the Food  and Agriculture  Organization  of the
UN for a number  of basic products,  notably  cereals. If this functions  as a measure  of
urban  bias, we expect  a negative  coefficient.  But regression  6 shows  CEREAL  to be
significantly  positive,  implying  that it is capturing  a process  of convergence,  whereby  the
more urbanized  a country,  the closer to international  prices  is its domestic  producer  price
of agricultural  commodities.  CEREAL's  explanatory  power,  however,  is low relative  to
income  or income  structure.
Another  measure  of distortion  which  could  presumably  disproportionately  affect  rural
areas,  or proxy for import  substitution  policies,  is the overvaluation  of the exchange  rate.
A common  measure  of this overvaluation  is the ratio of the black market  exchange  rate to
the official  rate, or the "black  market  premium"  (BMP). We expect that, all else
constant,  countries  with a higher  black market  premium  should  be more urbanized. This
is indeed  the case, as is shown  in regression  7. To make sure that we were not simply
capturing  a Latin  American  effect  (Latin  American  countries  are highly urbanized  and
many had high black market  premia  in the eighties  and early nineties),  we ran regression
7 with a Latin  America  dummy. The variable  remained  significantly  positive. Its
14explanatory power is trivial, however, and it is not significant when other explanatory
variables, such as CEREAL, are introduced.
Shocks  to agriculture
Another important factor which could "push" people out of rural areas is a shock to
agricultural production.  Agricultural shocks can include not only weather shocks such as
droughts - during one drought year in Mauritania, for instance, population in the capital
city of Nouakchott doubled (Potts, 1995) - but also collapses in prices, disruptions in the
distribution system, or unavailability of fertilizers.
Rather than trying to create separate measures of these possible disruptions, we
constructed a variable that measures the difference between actual and expected crop
output.  POSCROPSH captures positive deviations (one or two standard deviations) from
expected crop yield, while NEGCROPSH does the same for negative shocks to crop
yield."  We expect the sign on POSCROPSH to be positive (indicating that a better-than-
expected crop yield over the previous 5 years will reduce the likelihood of a rural farmer
moving to the city) and the sign on NEGCROPSH to be positive, as a bad yield would
push people into the city.
Neither NEGCROPSH nor POSCROPSH are significant (regression 8). However, we
did get expected results using annual shock measures (rather than the sum over the
preceding 5 years).  This variable is highly sensitive to sample changes, however, and the
results were not always robust, so we did not include it in any of our summary
regressions.  The Barro-Lee measure of terms of trade shocks (growth rate of export
prices minus growth rate of import prices averaged over the preceding 5-year period) was
not significant in any of our regressions.
Civil  disturbances,  wars,  and famines
As mentioned above, in times of civil strife, armed conflicts and large-scale atrocities
tend to occur away from the center of power ( battlefields are usually in the countryside.
Mozambique and many other war-torn countries saw refugees flock to cities, usually the
main city, which is also where relief efforts tend to be concentrated.  Morrison's  1993
study of politically motivated violence and migration in Guatemala showed that even
when the number of deaths is relatively small, the "climate of fear" that these deaths
instill - particularly in rural residents - appears to have caused many individuals to
migrate.
"These  were calculated on an annual basis, with the variable given a value of 2 if the negative shock was
at least 2 standard deviations below expected, 1 if the shock was between 1 and 2 standard deviations
below expected, and 0 otherwise.  NEGCROPSH is the sum of these over five years.  It can therefore take a
value between 0, indicating no shocks in the previous five years, and 10 which would imply the country
experienced severe negative shocks to crop yields every year in the past five years.  POSCROPSH was
calculated using the same methodology.  Expected yield was calculated using OLS estimates from a
regression of actual yield on time.
15We used two different measures of civil disturbance. One, which is used in Easterly and
Levine (1997), is from Sivard (1996), who collects annual information on the numbers of
people killed because of civil conflict or war fought on the national territory.  The other,
food aid, more generally proxies for overall disturbances - economic or other.
The information collected in Sivard allowed us to test not only whether civil strife and
urbanization were related, but also whether the impact on urbanization varied with the
severity of the domestic disturbances. We constructed three measures based on the
information collected in Sivard: SIVARD, which indicates that the country was
mentioned in Sivard as having some form of civil strife; SIV1000, indicating that the
country had more than 1000 deaths; and SIV5000, which were countries with more than
5000 war-related deaths in the 5 preceding years.
Regression 9  shows that countries that experienced civil strife tend to be more urbanized,
holding all other variables equal. The severity of the conflict does not appear to matter,
as SIVARD yielded a better fit than SIV1000 or SIV5000.
The positive correlation between urbanization and civil strife is very sensitive to sample
changes, and is mostly driven by East Asian countries. Contrary to common perception,
over the 1960-95 period, it is not in Africa that most civil strife occurred.  Mentioned in
Sivard for some form of civil strife are 34% of the observations for East Asia, 24% for
Middle East and North Africa, and 20% each for Africa and Latin America.  The
prolonged nature of civil unrest in countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and the
Philippines seems to have contributed to their urbanization.
Clearly, however, whether people seek refuge in cities may depend on the nature and
structure of the conflict.  In Burundi, for example, people did move to Bujumbura to
escape the risk of slaughter. In Rwanda, on the other hand, one group dominated Kigali,
so that when refugees came back from Zaire, they tended to remain in the rural areas.
Both these countries have experienced civil strife and war over prolonged periods of
time, yet remain among the two least urbanized countries in the world.
Our alternative measure of domestic hardships, food aid, is collected by the FAO.  It
measures tons of cereal and non-cereal food aid received by a country. We expected both
measures (deflated by population) to be positively correlated with levels of urbanization,
given that aid is probably more readily available in urban centers and that it is probably
received in times of famine (which would most likely be pushing people out of the
countryside).  However, we find in regression 10 that cereal food aid (FOODAIDC) has a
negative sign and that non-cereal food aid (FOODAIDNC) is positive.  Both these results
are very vulnerable to the introduction of other variables.
Ease  of access  to urban  center
A basic elements in standard migration models is the ability of rural dwellers to move to
urban areas, which is affected by the availability of transportation and the distance to the
city. To proxy ease of transportation we used road density, and for distance to urban
centers we used population density.
16Road density was generally not significant, which may be due to the fact that while a
better road network does help people move to cities, it also means that the countryside is
better integrated into the national economy so that rural dwellers can benefit from access
to urban markets without having to move to urban areas.
As to population density, its partial correlation coefficient is generally significantly
negative, which we cannot explain.1 2 Finally, work by Henderson suggests that as
countries start urbanizing, their urban systems tend to be very "primate" - that is,
dominated by one main city.  This is supported by our data, and we find higher primacy
(defined as the percentage of urban dwellers who reside in the main city) is negativel*y
correlated with urbanization.  However, since this variable significantly reduces our
sample, we did not include it in Table 2.
Democracy  and urbanization
Non-democratic regimes with a large amount of cronyism and rent-seeking would be
expected to be relatively more urbanized, as people who wish to gain access to political
favors and rents concentrate their activities in the city (Ades and Glaeser, 1995). Also,
dictatorships are vulnerable to riots and uprising - which are urban phenomena - and
therefore probably rely on public spending to keep the urban masses reasonably content.
It should follow that non-democracies should be more urbanized given their level of
income or other explanatory variables.
To test these hypotheses, we ran regression 11 on two separate samples, distinguishing
between "democracies" and "non-democracies."  Non-democracies are countries
classified as not free or only partially free by Freedom House, and democracies are those
classified as free. Regressions 12 and 13 in Table 3 show the results.  The coefficients on
income, on the share of GDP derived from manufacturing, and on the education variables
are much higher in non-democratic countries.  However, none of these differences is
statistically significant (that is, an interactive term between the democracy dummy and
these variables is never significant in regressions on the whole sample.)  Nor did we find
the democracy variable to be significant when entered directly in a regression run on the
whole sample.
Barkley and McMillan (1994) argue that a lack of political and civil liberties can limit
individuals' ability to respond to economic incentives.  The government may restrain the
movement of people and resources, or affect market information concerning relative
returns to resources, reducing reliance on the accuracy of economic indicators and
migration incentives.
12 Note that the simple correlation between urbanization and density is positive.
17Table 3: Democracy and levels of urbanization
Regression  12  13  14
non-democracies  democracies  Interaction
dates available  1975-95  1975-95  1975-95
Ln(Y)  2.49**  1.62**  1.68**
(Ln(Y))
2 -0.15**  -0.093**  -.096**
Ln (Yag/Y)  -0.22**  -0.20**  -0.19**
Ln(Ymanuf/Y)  0.34**  -0.058  0.050
Africa*pre80  1.65**  -- droppeda  --  0.39
Africa*post80  2.12**  2.93**  1.20**
Africa*pre80*ln(Y)  -0.23**  -0.039**  -0.073*
Africa*pre80*ln(Y)  -0.28**  -0.44**  -0.17**
Ln(Noeduc)  -1.51**  -0.096**
(Ln(Noeduc)) 2 0.27**  0.033**
Ln(secondary)  0.17**  0.015
Ln(RUW)  0.16**  0.32**  0.28**
CivilRight*ln(RUW)  -0.021**
Sivard  0.018  0.093
Adj. R2 .875  .820  .851
N  166  99  303
a. There were no countries classified as "Free" in Africa before 1980.
Dependant variable is log of the level of urbanization.  Notes: See Table 2.
Thus where civil and political rights are low, urbanization should be much less affected
by urban rural wage differentials.  As a result, the convergence between rural and urban
wages should proceed more slowly in restricted civil environments.
Using Freedom House data on political and civil liberties, we tested whether urbanization
is in fact more closely related to economic incentives in freer countries.  Regression 14
shows the coefficient on an interactive term that allows RUW to change with the level of
civil liberties to be significantly negative. This implies that as civil liberties decrease,
urbanization occurs with much less rural-urban wage equalization.  An alternative
formulation (not reported here) uses dummies for the various levels of civil liberties and
confirms this result: it shows that in countries with a very low degree of civil liberties,
rural urban wage differentials are no longer significantly associated with urbanization. In
these countries, then, it would appear that the lack of civil liberties weakens the
relationship between economic incentives and urbanization. Results are very similar if
we use political liberties instead.
Ethnic  diversity  and urbanization
Easterly and Levine (1997) showed that ethnic diversity helps explain many of the public
policy choices of African countries - public policy choices that in turn account for much
of Africa's poor growth performance. We ask the question of whether these policy
choices may have affected urbanization, over and above their impact on income.
What we found was that the ethnic variables were not generally helpful in explaining
urbanization beyond what income could explain.  In other words, most of the ethnic
18diversity measures used by Easterly and Levine are significant when the income variable
is excluded from the regressions.  However, they are not (nor do they have any
explanatory power) when income is included. The variables are negative, suggesting that
the manner in which they affect urbanization is by depressing income, which in turn
reduces the level of urbanization.
Easterly and Levine also use a measure of racial tensions.  Following the same logic as
for SIVARD, we expect that racial tensions should result in higher urbanization.  Cities
tend to be centers where national identity is forged, and are less frequently dominated by
one ethnic group.  The racial tension data is only available for 1984, but to the extent that
this is related to structural issues in a country, we use it as a proxy for racial tensions.  over
the whole period.  The variable has a significantly positive effect on both the level and
the rate of urbanization.  In addition, it somewhat decreases the coefficient and level of
significance of the Africa dummies. Thus, even if we control for level of income or of
urbanization, racial tensions help explain higher than expected urbanization.
Regression 11 in Table 2 includes all significant variables,1 3 and shows that given the
Africa dummies we can explain almost 90% of cross country variations in levels of
urbanization.  This specification, however, treats all observations equally and does not
allow us to look at a country's individual urbanization process.  We therefore run the
regressions with country fixed effects, which enables us to determine how well we can
explain countries' individual urbanization processes.  Table 4 shows these results.
Countries'  evolution  over  time: a fixed effect  approach
In the fixed effect specification, shown in Table 4, we find that income and income
structure still are strongly correlated with a country's level of urbanization.  The results
are not substantially different than without fixed effects, although NOEDUC and
NOEDUC2, CEREAL or black market premia are never significant. Secondary
education and rural-urban wage differentials (RUW) are significant, as well as SIVARD
is usually significant, although it is now negative.  Thus, while civil strife is correlated
with higher urbanization across countries, it tends to reduce a given country's
urbanization level.  The negative crop shock variable is now significant and negative,
suggesting 'that countries that have experienced drops in yields in the previous five years,
will tend to have a lower than otherwise expected level of urbanization.  This could be
due to the fact that rural people become too poor to move after a large reduction in crop
yield, but in general the results on the crop shock variables are weak and highly sensitive
to sample changes.
13 Since civil and political rights data are only available from 1975 onwards, we omitted them from
regression 1  1.
19Table 4: Explaining urbanization level: fixed effects regressions on levels of urbanization
Regression  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22
Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Ln(Y)  0.75**  0.52**  0.66**  1.06**  0.91**  0.90**  0.75**  0.68**
(Ln(Y)) 2 -0.052**  -0.033**  -0.045**  -0.075**  -0.064**  -0.064**  -0.053**  -0.044**
Ln (Yag/Y)  -0.071**  -0.015  -0.055  -0.10**  -0.28**  -0.28**  -0.086**  -0.12**
Ln(Ymanuf/Y)  0.16**  0.13**  0.19**  0.13**  0.15**  0.15**  0.15**  0.14**
Year  0.017**  0.0079**  0.016**  0.015**  0.013**  0.013**  0.017**  0.0071**
Africa*pre80  -1.07**  -0.85**  -0.94**  -0.94**  -1.10**  -1.09**  -1.11**  -1.03**
Africa*post80
Africa*pre80*ln(Y)  0.11  0.22**  0.19**  0.078  0.16**  0.16**  0.11*  0.21**
Africa*pre80*ln(Y)  -0.032  0.093  0.069  -0.046  0.016  0.013  -0.033  0.064
post80  -0.089**  -0.026  -0.075**  -0.068**  -0.099**  -0.097**  -0.089**  -0.041**
Ln(Noeduc)  0.0064
(Ln(Noeduc)) 2 -0.00066
Ln(secondary)  0.13**  0.099**
Bmp  0.0000064
Cereal  0.0057




R2 within  .746  .811  .753  .730  .772  .774  .748  .816
R2 between  .329  .215  .132  .167  .742  .738  .323  .662
R2 overall  .390  .256  .067  .235  .707  .703  .385  .592
N  494  352  450  437  398  398  494  346
Dependant variable is log of the level of urbanization.  Notes: See Table 2.
20So is Africa different?
The dummy  for sub-Saharan  Africa,  in regression  1 (Table  2), is not significant,  implying  that
overall,  in the period 1965-1995,  Africa's level of urbanization  was not significantly  different
from that of other-countries  given its level of income  and economic  structure. 14 We also tested
our more specific  hypothesis  that Africa was relatively  underurbanized  prior to 1980,  and
overurbanized  thereafter. This theory supported  by the data in regression  2: the coefficient  on
Africa*pre8O  is significantly  negative  and that  on Africa*post80  significantly  positive.
An interactive  dummy  was used (Africa*post80*ln(Y)  and Africa*pre80*ln(Y))  to determine
whether  the relationship  between  levels  of income  and urbanization  was different  in Africa
relative  to the rest of the world. Regression  3, which  allows  Africa to differ from the rest of the
world both in intercept  and in slope, suggests  that  Africa was not in fact particularly  unique
prior to 1980. However,  after 1980  this changed. Not only was urbanization  relatively  high
among  African  countries  given their income  and education  levels (positive  sign on the
Africa*post80  dummy),  but differences  in income  began to explain  less of the differences  in
urbanization.
Since  we are in fact interested  in African  countries' individual  urbanization  processes  over time,
the fixed  effect specification  is of greater  interest. However,  we cannot use the pre- and post-
1980  Africa dummy  with fixed effects,  because  we do not have  a balanced  panel. Table  4 is
therefore  of moderate  use in helping  us answer  the question  of whether  Africa's urbanization
was different. Instead,  we run a fixed-effect  regression  without  the Africa dummy,  and regress
its residuals  on the fixed-effects  regression.
Table  5: Regression  of Fixed  Effect Residuals
Regression:  24  25
Fixedeffects  Yes  No  -
Dependant variable  Log of urbanization  Residuals of regression 24







Ln (secondary)  0.14**
Post8O  -0.01
Ln(RUW)  0.02
Africa*pre80  ..  -0.29**
Africa*post80  ..  0.33**
Africa*pre80*ln(Y)  ..  0.04**
Africa*post80*ln(Y)  ..- 0.05**
R2 within  0.76
R2 between  0.72
R2 overall  0.65  0.12
N  346  346
Notes: See Table 2.
14 Note however that the Africa dummy is significant in the absence of variables on the structure of the economy.
21Table 5 shows the results, leading us to conclude that Africa's urbanization process was indeed
different from the world's both before and after 1980. African countries were generally
underurbanized prior to 1980, and urbanized faster than expected during the 1965-80 period
given their income level and structure, their levels of human capital, and their rural-urban wage
differentials. This resulted in higher-than-expected levels of urbanization in the post 80 period.
Following 1980, any change in income was associated with smaller changes in urbanization
level.  None of the other explanatory variables help decrease the value or significance of these
Africa dummies. The conclusion then does hold that Africa is different, but we cannot, with
traditional causes such as rural-urban income differentials or urban bias, explain why this is so:
Explaining  changes  in urbanization
The puzzle raised by Figure 1 is that Africa urbanized rapidly despite protracted negative
growth.  In fact, we find that in general the relationship between changes in urbanization and
changes in income is much weaker than the relationship between levels of income and levels of
urbanization.  Variations in income and income squared alone explain 72% of the variation in
urbanization levels, but growth in income explains only 5% of growth in urbanization, even if
we disaggregate income growth into its rural and urban components.
The generally weak relation between changes in income and in urbanization is due in part to the
fact that rates of increase in urbanization are much more stable than rates of increase in income.
Our sample means for the growth rate of income and urbanization are both 1.6% per annum, but
the minimum for urbanization is -0.9% while for income it is - 1l%.15  Negative urbanization is
extremely rare.  As shown in the Appendix, only 12 countries ever experienced decreases in
their levels of urbanization'6. Finally, urbanization converges to 100% while income is (in
theory at least) unbounded by any upper limit.
Nevertheless, we can "explain" a good part of the change in a country's urbanization level.  First
and foremost, changes in urbanization are related to a country's level of urbanization.  This is
shown in Table 6: U60, the level of urbanization in 1960, together with a time trend (year),
explain about 55% of variations in the rate of urbanization across countries.  ZY, the growth rate
in income per capita, has no explanatory power whatsoever.
The Africa dummy shows that African countries did urbanize more rapidly than expected prior
to 1980, and less rapidly after 1980. The fact that the AFRICA*PRE80 dummy is significant in
regression 2 despite the fact that we correct for initial urbanization level, suggests that African
countries where not simply "catching up".  Other policies or conditions were in place that
resulted in remarkably rapid urbanization during this period.
15 The maximum is about 12% for both.  These numbers are for the larger sample of 630 countries.  For the smaller
sample of 443 countries used in table 5,  the sample mneans  are 1.5% for growth in urbanization (with a minimum of
-0.8%  and a maximum of 8.3%) and 1.2% for growth in income (varying between -7.5%  and 7.8%.)
16 Negative urbanization may have occurred in recent years in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
22Table 6: Regressions in Changes in Urbanization
Regression  1  2  3  4
dates available  1965-95  1965-95  1970-95  1970-95
ln(u60)  -0.012**  -0.012**  -0.013**  -0.012**
year  -0.00028**  -0.00019**  -0.00015**  -0.00014**
zy  0.016  00.015
Africa  0.0011
Africa*pre80  0.0043**  0.0036*  0.0035
Africa*post80  -0.0026*  -0.0052**  -0.0051 **
zYags  -0.023*  -0.023*
zYinds  0.016**  0.016**
lagruw  -0.0014*
Adj. R 2 .549  .562  .603  .585
N  630  630  443  437
Dependent variable is change in % urban population.  Notes: see Table 2.
Since urbanization is thought to be associated with structural changes in the economy, we
include terms for the share of growth derived from agriculture and from industry: ZYAGS and
ZYINDS. 17 The share of growth in services was never significant, so we omitted it because it
introduced collinearity problems. As expected, we find that growth in agricultural value added
is associated with slower urbanization rates, while increases in industrial value added are
positively correlated with urbanization. The explanatory power of structural change variables is
small, however, as they only increase the R2 by about 1 percentage point.  However, their
explanatory power increases substantially when we exclude Africa from the sample (then they
add about 4 percentage points to the R2.)  Neither ZYAGS nor ZYINDS is significant in the
African sample.
We also test whether differences in rural and urban wages affect the speed of the urbanization
process.  Since we want to establish the direction of causality, we used lagged values of RUW.
The negative coefficient on LAGRUW confirms what most micro studies have found, namely
that low rural (relative to urban) wages contribute to rural-urban migration.  In addition, the
AFRICA*PRE80 dummy is generally not significant once LAGRUW is included in the
regression.  In other words, the speed of Africa's urbanization prior to 1980 is no longer extra-
ordinary if we take into account the very large disparities between urban and rural wages.  In
Africa in 1970, the average product of labor in agriculture was only 15% of that in industry and
services. In South Asia and East Asia it was about 26%.
17 These are calculated  as annual average growth in value  added in agriculture and in industry, weighted by their
shares of GDP. They are not deflated by growth in population.
23Table 7: Regressions in Changes
Regression  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
dates available  1970-90  1975-95  1970-95  1970-95  1970-95  1975-95  1970-95  1975-95
In(u60)  -0.011 **  -0.012**  -0.012**  -0.012**  -0.11 **  -0.01  1**  -0.012**  -0.012**
year  -0.00010  -0.00013**  -0.00015**  -0.00013**  -0.00047  -0.00011 *  -0.00014**  -0.00012*
Africa*pre80  0.00077  0.0048**  0.0054**  0.0036  0.0023  0.0025  0.0031  0.0019
Africa*post8O  -0.0062**  -0.0043**  -0.0062**  -0.0050**  -0.0037**  -0.0050**  -0.0052**  -0.0052**
zYags  -0.0085  -0.020  -0.023  -0.021  -0.0057  -0.011  -0.023*  -0.012
zYinds  0.012*  0.014**  0.20**  0.16**  0.012*  0.010  0.015**  0.0092








Sivard  -0.0020*  -0.0021*
Democracy  -0.0016*  -0.0020**
ln(foodaidc)  -0.00043
ln(foodaidnc)  0.00050
Adj. R2 .593  .603  .588  .589  .554  .580  .588  395
N  368  412  382  432  329  395  437  .583
Dependent  variable  is change  in % urban  population.  Notes:  see Table 2..
24As Table 7 shows, none of the explanatory variables discussed earlier contribute
significantly to explaining urbanization. In particular, initial education does not explain
differences across countries in the rate of urbanization.  Nor do our urban bias measures
(CEREAL or BMP), the crop shock variables, or the food aid data.  We do find that
SIVARD is significantly negative, indicating that civil strife reduces the growth rate in
urbanization (the opposite sign from what we expected). The coefficient on the
democracy variable is also significantly negative, suggesting that democracies tend to
urbanize less rapidly than non-democracies, all else constant.
Our sample includes developed countries with a mature urban system, which have
essentially stopped urbanizing.  We checked whether any of our results changed if we
excluded them. The results were generally robust to the change in samples (although the
coefficient on cereal food-aid became significantly negative).
Conclusion
Urbanization levels are closely correlated with levels of income.  But changes in income
do not explain changes in urbanization.  Urbanization continues even during periods of
negative growth, carried by its own momentum, largely a function of the level of
urbanization.  From that point of view, Africa's urbanization without growth is not a
puzzle.
The finding of a strong positive association in levels between urbanization and income,
combined with the absence of such a relationship in changes should be related to similar
results obtained by Easterly (1999) on the relation between income and quality of life
indicators.  Easterly speculates on this patterns of results as (i) the long and variable lag
that comes between growth and changes in the quality of life, (2) the possibility that
global socio-economic progress is more important than home country growth for many
quality of life indicators.  Similar explanations could be applied to urbanization, notably
the possibility that with globalization comes and inherent push for urbanization.
Factors other than income that help predict differences in levels of urbanization across
countries include: income structure, education, rural-urban wage differentials, ethnic
tensions and civil disturbances.  Also, the relationship between economic incentives and
urbanization is weaker in countries with less civil or political liberties.
Factors other than the initial urbanization level that help explain the speed of urbanization
include: the sector from which income growth is derived, ethnic tensions, civil
disturbances and democracy (the latter two contributing to slowing the pace of
urbanization, all else constant.)  Rural-urban wage differentials, whether they represent
an urban bias, or simply lower productivity in agriculture than in other sectors are also
significant determinants of the rate of growth of urbanization.  Furthermore, at least in the
pre-1980 period, the inclusion of rural-urban wage differentials in regressions reduces the
significance of the Africa dummy - in other words, they explain the otherwise "extra-
ordinary" pace of urbanization in Africa in the post-colonial period.
25Our measures of urban bias (ratio of domestic to world price of cereals; black market
premium) or of shocks to agriculture are never significant determinants of either the level
or the pace of  urbanization. At any rate, they do not help explain why Africa is different.
One can question whether the particularly high rural-urban wage differentials in Africa in
the post-colonial period is a symptom of urban bias.  It is possible, but by no means
certain. They may have reflected differences in productivity - the fact that they gradually
decreased over time at about the same rhythm as in East and South Asia supports this
hypothesis.  Anyway, they are surely best understood as a symptom of elite - rather than
urban-- bias.
So does Africa's urbanization process remain a puzzle?  Africa, at the end of the colonial
period, was underurbanized given its income and income structure due to the policies of
the colonial powers. The 1960-80 period was characterized by very rapid urbanization,
even more rapid than can be explained by a catch-up hypothesis, traditional urban-bias
measures, agricultural shocks, or civil disturbances. It is largely explained, however, by
rural-urban wage differentials. The slowdown in the pace of urbanization after 1980 is
significantly greater than can be explained by our explanatory variables.  However, given
that Africa had urbanized "exceedingly rapidly" in the 1960-80 period, the slowdown that
followed is not unexpected. In fact, if we let initial urbanization level take 1975 values
for the 1980-90 observations (instead of 1960), the post-80 Africa dummy is no longer
significant.
Alternative explanations could, of course, be poor data. One argument is that
urbanization data in Africa are simple projections based on old census data and therefore
the results presented here have limited meaning and interest.  But if this were the case, we
should find that Africa in the post-80 period continued to urbanize exceedingly rapidly.
The bias would be in the other direction. Another point frequently made is that we may
severely underestimate income and income growth in Africa, as much of the economy
has gone underground to escape predatory governments. This point, while surely
accurate, 18 is moot because income growth explains so little of the pace of urbanization.
A more interesting criticism is that the distinctions between urban/rural and
formal/informal may be misplaced in developing countries, especially in Africa. Many
workers straddle these divisions, whether by seasonal or circular migration between town
and country, or moonlighting in the informal sector while holding a formal sector job
during the day (Jamal and Weeks, 1998). Even the economic activities we use to
distinguish between rural and urban sectors may not be appropriate. The growth of urban
agriculture in response to rising food prices and shortages and general urban poverty is a
good example of how strict rural vs. urban dichotomies may not be applicable to the
modern developing world (Tacoli, 1998). This, however, is far from being a uniquely
African phenomenon. In Nicaragua, 40% of the urban poor are employed in
18 The inclusion  in Zaire's national  accounts  of its "non-registered  economy"  raises  "effective"  GDP to
three times  the current  official  measures  of GDP  (Cour,  1991.)
26agriculture.'9 Nevertheless, the very fact that our results show a weak relationship
between urbanization and traditionally accepted migration factors may indicate that, in
Africa at least, we are omitting part of the urbanization story.  The fact that the informal
sector provides a significant source of income to urban migrants, coupled with the
apparent overlap of rural and urban activities, may shed light on the nature of
urbanization in Africa.
'9Nicaragua  draft PRSP  (http://www.mipres.gob.ni/grupoconsultivo)
27Appendix 1
African countries that experienced one episode of urbanization without growth over a
five year period, between 1960 and 1995:
Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire,
Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Togo,
Congo-Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Non-African countries that did:
Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen (Rep. of)
African countries that did not:
Burkina Faso, Lesotho
Countries that experienced a sustained period of negative urbanization (average annual
urbanization rate negative over a 5 year period)
Developed: Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden.
Less developed: Cambodia, China, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, Zaire
28Appendix 2
Contrasting the experience of the world's poor countries with that of Africa, 1960-
85
Urbanisation  and income
Non African  Poor  countries,  1960-85
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